Why Gen Z Is Losing Faith In Britain’s Traditional Parties

According to the Electoral Commission’s Young people's views on politics and voting 2026 survey, “Young people value democracy and want to participate in it”, with 81% of young people believing it is important to live in a democracy. 

But what kind of democracy, we must ask ourselves, prioritises paying pensioners to heat their homes over helping young disabled people with finding a job? 

Commentators such as Andrea Sotelo described the youth turnout at the 2024 general election as “telling a grim story” of the “profound disillusionment” young people suffer with politics. 

This is no surprise as parliament has cut education spending year-on-year for over a decade between 2009 and 2020.

Only 65% of the Gen Z population are registered to vote – the lowest proportion of any demographic in the UK - and of this only 56% voted in the 2024 election. This was nearly 4% lower than the overall national turnout of 59.7%, and the lowest turnout of any demographic. 

However, the lack of engagement with the electoral process does not betray Gen Z’s disillusionment with politics more widely, rather their view that the main parties are failing to cater for their needs. According to the Electoral Commission’s study, young people are predominantly interested in political material relating to employment, cost of living, housing and education, as these are the issues that affect them most. 

Perhaps it’s no coincidence that 18% of Gen Z voters in the 2024 election backed Green Party candidates, as Carla Denyer and Adrian Ramsey’s party won a record 4 seats. The Green emphasis on building 150,000 council homes every year and the introduction of rent controls appealed to the 18-24 voters, as only 0.4% of all homeowners in England are in this demographic. Meanwhile, the introduction of a 4-day week and a minimum wage of £15 for all further appealed to the 413,000 18-24 year-olds who were out of work in 2024, as party membership grew to over 220,000 by May 2026, making it the third-largest party by membership and the most popular amongst the Gen Z demographic. 

Similarly, as the proportion of 18-24 year olds Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) reached a 9-year high during the 2024 election campaign, right-wing minority parties also began gaining traction amongst the Gen Z electorate, as 2025 polling indicated that 17% of 18-24 year-olds would back Reform in the next general election, 9% more than would support the Conservatives. This support could be explained by Reform’s heavy online profile and emphasis on opening up employment for the youth, scapegoating migrant workers as an explanation for limited job opportunities and targeting the Gen Z demographic by weaponizing social media. 

As over 53% of Gen Z respondents to the Electoral Commission’s report received most of their political news on social media, Reform’s online profile has played a central role in the party’s popularity amongst this demographic, as Nigel Farage’s campaign tweets on X in 2024 received more interactions than Zarah Sultana, Jeremy Corbyn and Carla Denyer combined according to The Guardian. 

High political engagement makes the crisis even more tragic, because the lack of turnout can firstly be attributed to the loss of confidence in the mainstream parties to deliver Gen Z’s needs, and also the view that a vote for any other party is a wasted one. 

This is a criticism shared across age groups, and if the high-priority working-age electorate feel let down, what hope do the marginalised youth have?

The shift to the political fringes might be seen as inevitable, then, for Gen Z voters, as the traditional parties occupy the political middle-ground intended for the engaged middle aged and pensioner electorate, appealing to those seeking to maximise pensions and pay off mortgages, rather than those hoping to get onto the property ladder or to enter the job market for the first time. The charisma and communication of Reform and the progressive policies of the Greens go some way to answering the question of political realignment amongst the Gen Z electorate, but the cause of their disenchantment with mainstream politics can be found in the traditional powerhouses to whom the 18-24 year-olds are turning their backs, as years of education austerity, university fee hikes and healthcare neglect have driven them to the margins of politics. 

The “profound disillusionment” spoken of by Sotelo, therefore, sits not with politics as a democratic institution for change, but rather with the traditional powers that have ignored their wishes whilst in power, boosting support for minority parties and shifting political engagement amongst Gen Z across the spectrum. The unique demands and ignored concerns of the 18-24 electorate – that both cause and proliferates its low voter turnout – explain their move to the political extremes, and for as long as the extremes remain in minority, the Gen Z demographic will be stuck in a rewardless voting pact, backing those who stand for their demands, but hold little control. 

This, rather than a shift in cultural expectations or psychology is to blame firstly for the disillusionment of the Gen Z electorate with the traditional parties, and also the wider electoral apathy that grips Britain more so than any western European state. 

If there is wider disengagement amongst all age groups, then there is little wonder Gen Z are looking for change.