There is currently one word looming over Germany: ‘control’. Control of their borders, control of their laws, and control of immigration. This is the promise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), who have secured the first state far-right win for a German party since the Second World War, and managed to double the achievement since in Mecklenburg-Verpommern. Bundled with this label due to their vehement disapproval of Islam, their ethnonationalist stances, and advocation for selective immigration and remigration, the party promises an EU membership referendum upon its expected 2029 victory in the Bundestag. But the Brits know all too well about the price of ‘control’.
As the party’s first state victory, Saxony-Anhalt ranks as the second poorest state with 22.3% of its population at the brink of poverty–a fertile ground for populism to spread its roots. Meanwhile, the governing centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is facing paralysis, consequent of Friedrich Merz’s approval rate (the lowest ever for a German Chancellor).This comprehensive disdain for him comes from his austerity measures, his raising of the retirement age, cutting of health insurance benefits, and his sick leave crack-down. Aside from his spending, ‘stagflation’ also stunts his popularity, with inflation topping 3.3% and stagnation approaching its seventh year. Whilst the economy may be looking up, it could be too late for Merz, who is insistent in seeing things through whilst having ‘no intention of becoming the nation’s darling’. But Germany is not alone in austerity as an engine for right-wing demand, with the post-2010 British austerity programme fuelling demand for anti-establishment, and ultimately eurosceptic politics.
There is no wonder why the East feels left behind despite constant attempts to ‘catch it up’ with the West in the form of monetary aid. Reunification meant the fracture of the DDR’s industrial future which was set to continue on its path of synthetic innovation, developed to offset energy constraints and reduced crude oil supplies from the Soviet Union. Many enterprises, including their coal-based manufacturing, were not competitive enough for a capitalist economy. Only serving to worsen the pressure on factories was the strip of state support and selling of their assets. The culmination of these blows taken by East German industry pushed unemployment to skyrocket to 20% after the fall of the wall. Naturally, the last thirty years have softened the effects, but the impacts remain visible as wages stay 21% lower for earners in the East. Saxony-Anhalt in particular suffered the brunt as their GDP per capita stands at just €36,517 nationally, in stark comparison to the €50,819 on a national level.
One man has risen from the ashes of this consequent discontent–Ulrich Siegmund. Preying on the grievances of left-behind states, the co-Saxony-Anhalt Landtag leader weaponises the socio-economic scars that came with reunification, posing as a voice for the people. Implying a restoration of power to the people of the East who feel ‘establishment party’ policy is not built to help them, he shouts ‘we are taking our country back!’ and comparable rhetoric to the state’s AfD members. These same sentiments ring familiar to the British, standing at the forefront of Farage’s leave campaign, similarly claiming to move past political point scoring to ‘take our country back’. Carnegie Europe’s series of interviews with these supporters shows the state is buying into this UKIP-esque populist message, with frequently expressed longings for the safety net of the DDR (an effect known more commonly to the Germans as Ostalgie). This nostalgia, an interviewee goes on to claim, is understood by nobody but the AfD—a voice for the neglected.
This same party stands ready to abandon intergovernmental organisations like the EU in the name of control, and perhaps this is attractive to states who feel they have nothing to lose. With Brussels as the perfect scapegoat for the migration they claim to hurt the economy, the East feels its time to ‘catch-up’. Whilst Germany is the largest net contributor into the EU, the single market boosts the average annual income of German citizens by more than €1000 (vast amounts more than the €130-160 that they pay in). Leaving the EU may mean that Germany does not have to bankroll less affluent nations, but it also means they will miss out on the benefits of the single market–a feature which saves German companies billions in transaction costs with half of exports being shipped to member states. If it walks away from the EU and the common market, Germany risks losing not only its frictionless trade, but its tight-knit relationship with the rest of Europe. Britain’s costly experiment away from the common market is testament to this with UK exports to the EU falling by 14% and imports by 10%—figures driven by bureaucracy and tariff barriers. The exodus has also resulted in a projected 4% less domestic productivity, which in tandem with falling trade would be even more brutal for Germany’s more export-reliant economy.
This detriment was ironically compounded with the loss of the Dublin III Regulation, stripping Britain’s ability to return asylum seekers to the first EU country they entered. The border crossings of the last six years have been directly impacted by the undermining of the border-control mechanisms that Britain’s departure was supposed to strengthen. Leaving the EU might mean ‘taking back control’, but if leaving the union and common market taught Britain anything, it is that sovereignty can come at a steep price. For the United Kingdom, it was 8% of their economy and 4,318 small boats, but for Saxony-Anhalt (as part of Germany’s most vulnerable) this economic detriment could be even more catastrophic.
It is not just the EU that the AfD approaches with trepidation, with NATO acting as a focal point in policy. Co-leader Tino Chrupalla advocates for a markedly more pro-Kremlin foreign policy in Germany. Chrupalla maintains that in the condition the institution cannot ensure the respect of Moscow’s interests, ‘Germany must consider to what extent this alliance is still useful for us’. His subsequent claims in an interview with centre-right newspaper Die Welt, stating his hopes to establish a ‘new security structure in Europe’, signal a radical departure from Atlanticist orientation. These remarks suggest a new friendship may come to fruition between Moscow and Berlin—one that comes at the expense of its traditional allies from the West, particularly when paired with the prospect of an EU referendum. In regards to the East, a departure from this source of stability could be a deterrent for foreign investment needed for the economic growth they are being promised. On its own, an EU withdrawal referendum saw the lowest level of foreign investment into the UK since the 1980s. The former DDR states can ill afford a similar decline.
Opposing parties may be unsure of how to combat this populist parasite, but they remain united in their certainty of their refusal to govern alongside it. This agreement has taken the form of the Brandmauer (Wall of Fire), marking refusal of collaboration in attempt to deplatform the movement. Whilst non-cooperation should set a precedent across Germany about attitudes towards the far-right, it serves to feed into the image of the elite ignoring the ‘outsider’ and the will of the people. Siegmund too highlights his aversion to working with his competition, extending a hand to parties willing to ‘transform politics’, whilst affirming the AfD will not bend to other parties’ will. With Germany’s proportional representation system, we hark back to the struggle of Brexit under a majority government, asking if the combination of a hung parliament and a refusal of cooperation means a German EU departure (‘Dexit’) deal may be reminiscent of our Brexit deadlock. For Brits, this meant years of uncertainty over their economic future.
Their intolerance for opposition, IGOs, and solidarity with Ukraine extends into their attitudes toward multiculturalism. The party’s 2017 manifesto seems to serve as a declaration of war on the ideology, with members historically voicing disdain for Islam. Even deputy-leader Beatrix von Storch labels it a ‘political ideology that is not compatible with the constitution’, calling for a ban on burqas, niqabs, and minarets. Aside from Islam, multiculturalism as a whole seems to be at the epicentre of their policy, with the same document stating the idea of multiculturalism is ‘blind to history’ and attempts to put other cultures on par with German culture, degrading the value system of the latter. This British political landscape in the lead-up to Brexit was similarly shaped by toxic and vehement islamophobia, particularly following the murder of Lee Rigby - a brutal consequence of Islamic fundamentalism. But buying into these generalisations of muslims peddled often by populists risks defining ‘Britishness’ and ‘Germanness’ alike by skin colour and religion, reducing our values, traditions and institutions to a narrow ethnic definition. Nevertheless, the AfD’s message is clear: multiculturalism is a threat to German tradition and should be seen accordingly.
Whilst the AfD may offer Germany some illusion of ‘control’, they could potentially lose out on the benefits of a common market and the diversity of skill brought by immigration via an EU-departure and an even more selective immigration system. Despite legal migration crack-downs, Germany could find itself in the same paradox as post-Brexit Britain with overwhelming numbers of illegal migrants. And in wishing for the safety net of the DDR, they could instead be greeted with the shock of the loss of the NATO alliance. As the consensus continues to splinter in places like Saxony-Anhalt, they are sold ‘Dexit’ as a means of national control which will bring with it prosperity. But in the approach to the 2029 Bundestag elections, we must ask the Germans to remember the detriment of the rise of UKIP, and the subsequent Conservative Brexit deals. The AfD’s support is bigger than just Saxony-Anhalt, but it is states like it that will suffer the most from moving away from its European counterparts. Already under economic pressure, the EU referendum will not address structural problems of underinvestment and economic decline, instead adding to the unsolved pile of grievances.
